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Abstract
The risk associated with lending to small businesses has become more important since
regulations started obliging banks to use separate procedures in assessing SMEs' credit
worthiness. However, current accounting-based models for SMEs do not account for the
impact of market information on default prediction. We fill this gap in the literature by
introducing a hybrid default prediction model for unlisted SMEs that uses market information
of listed SMEs (comparable approach) alongside existing accounting information of unlisted
SMEs. Our results suggest that the accuracy of this default prediction modelling approach in
the hold-out sample, during the period of the financial crisis 2007-09 and for the entire
sample-period, improves considerably. We conclude that the proposed hybrid model is a
good replacement for existing standard accounting-based methods on SMEs' default
prediction.
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11. Introduction
Credit risk refers to the risk created by unexpected changes in the credit quality of a
counterparty or issuer and its quantification is one of the major challenges in modern
finance.1 Traditionally, it is measured as the firm’s likelihood of default on its contractual or
required obligations and the monetary losses imposed if such default occurs. Although SMEs
are the most active economic units representing the backbone of a nation’s economy, due to
their special characteristics, their credit and operational risks are perceived to be higher.
These risks are especially prevalent during periods of prolonged financial crises as they pose
a significant threat to the real economy given the potential negative impact on companies’
profits, sales and investment (Claessens et al., 2012).
In a recent study, Gupta and Gregoriou (2015) show that the proportion of US SMEs
under financial distress in their sample had increased from 19% in 1990 to 31.61% in 2013.
At the same time, the proportion of actual bankruptcies had fallen from 1.39% to 0.5% for the
corresponding period with micro-SMEs being the companies worst affected. 2 A similar
picture is portrayed in the UK where according to the Office for National Statistics (ONS),
the average death rate for new businesses in the period 2009-14 is reported as 10.35% with a
five-year survival rate of only 41.7% (ONS, 2015). In an attempt to explain this trend,
Guariglia et al. (2016) demonstrate a statistically significant link between debt-financing cost
and corporate survival rates for young and non-exporting firms, especially during the period
of the 2007-09 financial crisis when borrowing rates had increased dramatically. This
reduced survival rate for SMEs was amplified by the considerable difficulty in obtaining the
necessary finance for their operations. Government statistics in the immediate aftermath of
1 Since it is not certain whether the firm’s obligation will be fulfilled or not, the potential borrower’s
creditworthiness affects all aspects of the firm’s cost of capital, the lending decision, the credit spread and the
prices and hedge ratios of relevant credit derivatives.
2 Of all the bankruptcies reported in this study, 40% were attributed to the micro-SMEs sample. A similar
pattern is reported for the case of financially distressed firms where micro-SMEs comprise 41.49% of the total
sample.
2the 2007-09 financial crisis show that only 74% of those SMEs seeking finance in the year
2010 indeed managed to obtain some form of it as compared to a rate of 90% in the period
2007/08 (BIS Economics Paper, 2012). This decreased ability of SMEs to access short-term
capital is mainly attributed to the supply of bank lending as banking and financial institutions
became more risk averse as well as being legally obliged, by new financial services
regulations, to increase their liquidity by holding more capital.3 Extant literature shows that
unlike their large-size counterparts, SMEs’ applications for financing tend to be rejected
more frequently, with the evidence for this being consistent across the entire spectrum of
SME activity, industrial classification and their ability to innovate (Lee et al, 2015).
The severity of this problem in the UK setting has been extensively highlighted over the
years in a series of governmental reports. For example, Cruickshank (2000) suggests the
existence of systemic problems affecting the quality of lending services for SMEs such as the
possible overcharging for such services by banks, the lack of available information regarding
alternative banking products, and the existence of significant weaknesses in the systems of
redress when things go wrong for the borrowing firms. As the report concludes, these
problems are exacerbated by the presence of a complex monopolistic structure in the UK
banking environment (Cruickshank, 2000, pp.161-167). A more recent joint-study by the
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)
further supports such claims. It points out that high barriers to entry and expansion in the
supply of business current accounts (BCAs) and general business loans to SMEs for newer
and smaller credit providers are a major weakness of the UK bank lending system (CMA &
FCA, 2014). This study also reports a significant widening of the difference in the interest
rate charged by banks to SMEs for term loans and the Bank of England (BoE) base rate. For
example, from an annual average of less than 2.5% in the period prior to the financial crisis,
3 This is an inevitable consequence of the credit crunch period and the global economic crisis that followed.
3interest rates have increased to 4% or more in the period 2008-2012. Hence, all prior policy
literature unanimously highlights the need for improving market competition in UK banking.
Allowing smaller credit providers to enter the market will most certainly improve lending
services, thereby reducing both the cost of such services for SMEs and the rate of
insolvencies for such firms.
This large increase in SME insolvencies during and after the 2007-09 financial crisis,
alongside the introduction of the Basel II capital requirements for banks, have led to a
renewed interest in the SME credit risk assessment literature with the main focus on
accounting-based default prediction models designed specifically for SMEs.4 Nonetheless,
although these models are easy to use in a practical sense, they ignore the important role of
market factors in predicting potential default events. In terms of credit risk quantification
using market-based information, one of the most widely-used models in academic literature
and practice alike is the one introduced by Merton (1974) and further developed by the KMV
Corporation. 5 Although this model has significant advantages over the accounting-based
approaches, including better predictability during financial crises and over short-term
horizons, the unavailability of market information in the case of unlisted companies deems it
inapplicable for the majority of SMEs (Richardson et al., 1998; Bilderbeek and Pompe, 2005;
Lin et al., 2007). To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior literature regarding the effect
of market-based factors on the accuracy of the unlisted SMEs’ default prediction models and
especially no elaborate default prediction models that can use market information for
predicting their potential default.
Hence, our study addresses this important gap in the literature by introducing a new
modelling approach that can utilise market information for predicting unlisted SMEs’ default
4 According to Dullmann and Koziol (2013), since small firms are more likely to default due to their
idiosyncratic risk, accounting information is the essential tool in SME default prediction models
5 This study follows the modelling approach of Chen et al. (2010). In line with their study we also refer to this
modelling approach as the Merton-KMV model.
4using an average sample of 181 UK listed SMEs (L-SMEs thereafter) and 19,681 unlisted
SMEs (U-SMEs thereafter) over the period 2004-2013. This is accomplished by combining
market and accounting information in a way that takes into account the association between
U-SMEs’ accounting ratios and the Merton’s distance-to-default (DD) for L-SMEs. Our
hybrid default prediction model exhibits superior predictive power compared to its existing
accounting-based counterparts when tested across our entire sample of U-SMEs.
The rationale behind this approach is simple. Prior studies in the field of corporate
finance highlight the benefits of adopting a comparability method in equity valuation of
unlisted/private companies using industry-level data (Alford, 1992; McCarthy, 1999; Baker
and Ruback, 1999).6 In a similar manner, we show that such a method has important benefits
in default prediction. If the use of a market-based valuation approach is a reliable way for
deriving firm value for unlisted/private companies (Alford, 1992; Baker and Ruback, 1999),
then there is no theoretical reason why this approach cannot also be used for the purpose of
default prediction in the case of such firms. Bhojraj and Lee (2002) further suggest that the
use of market-based valuation multiples usually functions as a “satisficing” device for the
professional community, trading off methodological complexity and completeness for the
purpose of convenience and cost efficiency. Likewise, from the perspective of a large and
highly-diverse bank engaging primarily in transaction lending technologies, lending to
informationally ‘opaque’ SMEs poses significant risks and costs. Assuming a decision to lend
to a L-SME or an U-SME is mutually exclusive, a bank will most likely be inclined to lend to
the former type of company as the cost of accessing all relevant ‘soft’ information for the U-
SMEs can be relatively high.7 Our proposed approach solves this problem, by allowing U-
SMEs to be treated as if they are of a ‘quasi-listed’ status and be judged in terms of credit
ability on an equal basis to the former type of firms. Furthermore, under conditions of market
6 This approach is typically used for the purposes of fundamental analysis or multiple-based valuation in IPOs.
7 Such higher costs typically lead to higher interest rates on borrowing for the case of SMEs (Baas and
Schrooten, 2006).
5efficiency8 the use of market-based information can be considered as a credible source of
anticipated economic conditions, as the latter will affect not only the L-SMEs but the U-
SMEs as well.9
Our results indicate that the new methodological approach can forecast U-SMEs’ default
better than the traditional way of empirically using a set of accounting ratios, as the use of the
proxied market information significantly increases the accuracy of prediction. Moreover, our
new hybrid model appears to be superior in predicting U-SMEs’ default events during the
financial crisis and within a short-time span, a vital aspect for all banks engaging in U-SMEs’
lending activities as part of their day-to-day operations.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 reviews the market-based default prediction
models literature. Section 3 presents the data collection procedure, the estimation of the
relevant modelling variables and introduces our new hybrid model. Section 4 discusses the
empirical findings on its performance. Section 5 concludes.
2. Prior literature
2.1. Lending technologies
Traditional bank lending approaches are typically distinguished between transaction-
based lending and relationship-based lending. As prior literature suggests, both technologies
appear to have important benefits but their adoption is typically determined by factors such as
the size of the borrowing firm, its financial history, the transparency of the borrower’s
financial statements, but also the size and organisational structure of the lender (Berger and
Udell, 2002; Baas and Schrooten, 2006; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Hernández-
Cánovas and Martínez-Solano, 2010; Bartoli et al., 2013). The former technology,
8 Meaning that stock prices “fully reflect” all available information, i.e. company- and non-company-specific.
9 As market prices are a function of anticipated future cash flows, wider economic events such as potential
economic recessions or financial crises will be reflected in asset values via this pricing mechanism. Using L-
SMEs market data for U-SMEs’ default prediction allows us to take into account the impact of such events on
the organisational viability of the latter firms on an ex ante basis.
6transaction-based lending, encapsulates the three lending technologies of financial statement
lending, asset-based lending, and credit scoring. This is typically used by larger banks
utilising quantitative data obtained from the borrowers’ financial statements backed with
appropriate collateral guarantees (Berger and Udell, 2006).10 In contrast, SME lending is
predominately driven by the use of relationship lending technologies. These technologies
require closer monitoring of the SME and allow access to qualitative information through
frequent and personal interaction between the loan officer and the manager of the firm
(Berger and Udell, 2002). Such technologies are often considered as a panacea for bank-SME
relationships as they allow lenders to grant access into proprietary information of otherwise
‘opaque’ SMEs. Extant literature shows that relationship lending leads to the increased value
of such information (Berger and Udell, 2002, 2006; Schæffer, 2003; Boot et al., 2005;
D'Aurizio et al., 2015), reduction in information asymmetry (Berger et al., 1999; Boot, 2000),
optimal lending decision-making for smaller banks (Berger and Black, 2011), lower
borrowing costs for the SMEs (Peterson and Rajan, 1994; Schæffer, 2003) and continuation
of credit lines for SMEs specially during financial crises (Bolton et al., 2016).
Nonetheless, not all studies are supportive to this view. Baas and Schrooten (2006)
show that interest rates on loans to SMEs are unrelated to the duration of the lending
relationship between the two parties and that borrowers are charged higher interest rates
when banks rely on relationship lending technologies as opposed to those markets where both
alternative lending technologies exist.11 A handful of studies also show that both technologies
(transaction-based and relationship-based) tend to be complementary to each other (Uchida et
al., 2008; Muro, 2010; Bartoli et al. 2013). Bartoli et al. (2013) suggest that this
complementarity of lending technologies is possibly driven by efficiency considerations such
10 These lending technologies are also used, to some extent, for SMEs with long financial history and audited
financial statements.
11 This study corroborates the evidence produced by Petersen and Rajan (1994), Angelini et al. (1998) and
Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000).
7as the need of lenders to increase the degree of delegation (decentralisation) and lower the
turnover of branch managers. They also show that soft information tends to be used in
combination with hard information when lenders are using both technologies as a primary
tool for lending decisions.
2.2. Approaches to default prediction
There is extensive literature spanning more than three decades on business failure
prediction with the majority of such studies concentrating on the use of various models on
large and publicly listed companies.12 Regarding SMEs’ default prediction, prior research is
rather scarce with just a handful of studies simply suggesting the importance of developing
more advanced models specific to small firms’ characteristics (Altman and Sabato, 2007;
Altman et al., 2010). Moreover, as the majority of such firms are typically unlisted, their
evaluation in terms of credit risk is predominantly carried out (in practice) using accounting-
based models. However, such models manifest significant theoretical and practical
weaknesses. Firstly, reliance on accounting statements to assess credit worthiness tends to be
unreliable given that accounting ratios are based on historical information and therefore not
necessarily informative in predicting SMEs’ future performance (Agarwal and Taffler, 2008).
This is more prevalent in the case of their assets where the use of historical cost
accounting results in true asset values usually being very different to their recorded book
values. As Hillegeist et al. (2004) argue, accounting-based models are designed under the
assumption that firms are not likely to go bankrupt resulting in the asset value of the
company, especially fixed and intangible assets, often being overestimated in the financial
statements. This problem is further amplified by potential managerial incentives to
manipulate accounting information, under conditions of financial distress, and is found to be
12 For a more comprehensive review of the different approaches readers can refer to Duffie and Singleton
(2003), Tudela and Young (2003), Charitou et al. (2004), Vassalou and Xing (2004), Balcaen and Ooghe
(2006), Bharath and Shumway (2008) amongst others.
8more extensive in the case of SMEs where owners tend to be also the company’s managers
(Campa and Camacho-Miñano, 2015).
Empirically, Richardson et al. (1998) show that accounting-based models perform
significantly worse compared to the use of trained experts (loan officers) as these models are
unable to control for information changes caused by business cycles and are unable to control
for issues such as the volatility of the firm’s assets. This large deterioration in predictability is
more evident during recessionary periods where there is a rapid escalation in the number of
bankruptcies (Bilderbeek and Pompe, 2005). This problem is more serious for the case of U-
SMEs, as the likelihood of such companies failing during times of recession is considerably
higher than average. As Shumway (2001) argues, using only accounting ratios in default
prediction models leads to suboptimal decision-making as market-driven variables such as
past stock returns, their variability and the firm’s market size are all significantly related to
default. The author goes further, proposing a model that produces out-of-sample forecasts
using both accounting-ratios and market-driven variables that demonstrate an increased level
of prediction accuracy compared to other alternatives. Subsequent empirical tests by Chava
and Jarrow (2004) confirm the superior forecasting performance of Shumway’s (2001) model
over previous modelling approaches such as those of Altman (1968) and Zmijewski (1984).
A significant development in solving the aforementioned problems and in improving
bankruptcy prediction was the introduction of structural models that utilise option pricing
theory in corporate debt valuation such as those introduced by Black and Scholes (1973) and
Merton (1974). In particular, the latter approach by Merton (1974), Merton DD model
thereafter, provided the foundation for all subsequent market-based default prediction models
currently present in the literature. Its advantage is the provision of an intuitive picture as well
as an endogenous explanation for credit default by connecting elements of credit risk to
underlying structural variables and incorporating option pricing methods in default
9prediction. As Wang (2009) argues, this model, including subsequent variants, not only
facilitates security valuation but also addresses the choice of alternative capital structures.
Prior literature overwhelmingly suggests that the use of the Merton DD model can
accommodate most of the aforementioned criticisms of accounting-based models as it
provides a methodological approach that is unlikely to be affected by a firm’s accounting
policies and is not time- or sample-dependent (Hillegeist et al., 2004; Reisz and Perlich,
2004; Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Campbell et al., 2008).
However, as Agarwal and Taffler (2008) argue, neither accounting-based models nor market-
based models are exclusively sufficient for failure prediction as both incorporate unique sets
of company information.
Empirical testing of the Merton DD model in the UK confirms that its distance-to-default
measure (DD) is the most significant variable for measuring credit risk. With regard to the
use of accounting variables, these appear to be incrementally informative when added to the
main model (Demirovic and Thomas, 2011). This finding corroborates prior US literature on
the usefulness of combining market-based and accounting-based information in predicting
firm’s default (Beaver et al., 2005; Campbell et al., 2008). Benos and Papanastasopoulos
(2006) take a step further in modelling corporate default by introducing a hybrid model
derived from the combination of various credit risk approaches. Their study uses an ordered
probit regression model where the neutral distance to default is estimated from a series of
financial ratios while accounting-based measures are utilised as explanatory variables.13 This
new hybrid model demonstrates improved in-sample fitting credit ratings and out-of-sample
default predictability. These findings are also corroborated by Bellalah et al. (2016) and
Doumpos et al. (2014) who examine default risk predictability for French companies and
European listed firms respectively.
13In order to examine the efficiency of their hybrid modelling approach, Benos and Papanastasopoulos (2006)
estimate two different models in which risk neutral distance-to-default metric and financial ratios are used
separately as indicators of the firm’s default.
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Regarding the use of the Merton DD model in SMEs, there is only a handful of prior
studies due to the lack of available market information for such firms. Using a sample of 246
L-SMEs in the UK for the period 2001-2004, Lin et al. (2007) report higher predictive ability
of the Merton DD model for the short run (<1 year); while, accounting-based models are
found to be superior, in terms of accuracy, in the long run (>1 year). Finally, Chen et al.
(2010) use a similar approach in the examination of Chinese L-SMEs and suggest that the
predictive accuracy of the adjusted Merton DD model is highly sensitive to the identification
of the various default points.
Nonetheless, although the use of the above modelling approach demonstrates good
performance in terms of predicting SME default, it has only been applied to L-SMEs.
Unfortunately, these firms (L-SMEs) constitute only a very small proportion of the entire
SME sector in the UK economy. This is also the case for the market-based methodological
approaches used in the most recent studies of Doumpos et al. (2014) and Bellalah et al.
(2016) where, unlike listed firms, U-SMEs’ distance-to-default information is not available.
Given the points discussed earlier regarding the reliability of accounting-based models and
the importance of market-based information in predicting default events, it is of great
academic and practitioner interest to develop a hybrid default prediction model that combines
market and accounting information to predict the default events in the case for U-SMEs. We
now proceed to the discussion of our modelling approach that attempts to solve this problem
and fill this crucial gap in the literature.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
Our study employs a sample of listed (L-SMEs) and unlisted SMEs (U-SMEs). All L-
SMEs are selected based on the Basel definition for small firms, i.e. firms with total turnover
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value of less than £42 million. All operating and financial indicators are obtained from
Thomson’s Datastream. The final sample of L-SMEs is 198 companies, all of them in the
manufacturing sector covering the period from 2004 to 2013. With regards to the UK U-
SMEs’ sample, our dataset consists of approximately 20,000 companies per annum with all
relevant financial information obtained from Bureau Van Dijk’s FAME database. This
sample covers both active (non-defaulted) and dead (defaulted) SMEs with the latter category
including all firms in liquidation, administration and receivership during the period under
examination.
According to Table 1, the total number of defaults observed in our U-SMEs sample
based on aforementioned criteria is 14,170 out of a total sample of 196,807 SME
observations. This sample is unbalanced with the number of firms changing every year due to
various corporate events such as bankruptcy and M&A activities. Similarly, the default rates
in our sample also vary from year to year with a reported increase during the credit crunch
period of 2007-09. For instance, the default rates of U-SMEs for 2007, 2008 and 2009 are
7.21%, 8.56% and 9.44% respectively while the default rate for the entire period under
examination is 6.72%. A similar trend is observable in the case of L-SMEs with 5.79% for
2007, 6.42% for 2008 and 6.49% for 2009. However, as Table 1 shows, the total default rate
for L-SMEs compared to U-SMEs is lower (5.54% vis-à-vis 6.72%). This is not an
unexpected finding given that L-SMEs have better access to capital and inevitably are more
able to overcome possible financial difficulties.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Table 2 reports the statistical properties of our L-SMEs and U-SMEs sample using a
number of accounting indicators.14 All variables are winsorized 5% in each tail to reduce the
impact of outliers. Although the average retained earnings to total assets ratio (RETA) for U-
14 All accounting ratios used in our study are in line with prior literature in credit default prediction (Altman and
Sabato, 2007; Altman et al., 2010).
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SMEs and L-SMEs is -0.2534 and -0.0103 respectively, U-SMEs appear to be more
profitable than their listed counterparts with an average EBITTA of 0.6155 (0.2479 for the
case of L-SMEs) and an average net income to sales ratio (NIS) of 0.3245 (0.2277 for L-
SMEs). Moreover, the average short-term leverage (LEV) for U-SMEs is 1.5666 compared to
1.5072 for L-SMEs indicating that the former type of firms are marginally more reliant on
short-term borrowing despite the fact that they generally benefit from higher profitability. U-
SMEs also tend to hold more cash within their asset structure with an average cash to total
assets ratio (LIQ) of 0.1469 as compared to 0.0639 for L-SMEs. This cautionary approach in
financial management is more likely to be attributed to the U-SMEs’ greater reliance on
short-term borrowing as opposed to long-term borrowing which is indicated by the current
liabilities to non-current liabilities ratio (CLNCL) of 19.035 (14.621 for the L-SMEs).
Overall, the picture emerging from these statistics is that U-SMEs are, on average, more
profitable and operationally efficient but also more prone to face short-term liquidity
problems (financial distress). For example, although the average performance in terms of
cash to net sales (CNS) and net cash to net worth (NCNW) is 0.1058 and 0.3229 (0.0722 and
0.1351 for their L-SME counterparts), their performance in terms of working capital to total
assets (WCTA) and current assets to current liabilities (CACL) ratios is significantly lower
with 0.0929 and 1.6891 as compared to 0.1350 and 2.0423 in the case of the L-SMEs.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Table 3 also gives an insight on the absolute size of L-SMEs and U-SMEs in our sample
by comparing the average profitability, sales, total assets and total liabilities. L-SMEs have,
on average, higher total liabilities (£5.437m) and total assets (£7.755m), while sales and
profitability are, on average, also substantially higher with £35.769m and £7.696m compared
13
to their non-listed counterparts (£15.353m and £1.964m respectively). 15 These results
indicate that L-SMEs are on average larger firms, less geared and more efficient in generating
sales and profits for their equity holders. This finding is further supported by the reported
average median values.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
3.2. Merton-KMV modelling approach
Our market-based indicators of default are estimated from the sample of UK L-SMEs
followed by the use of appropriate calibration techniques needed to obtain the hybrid
indicators of default that combines both accounting and market information for the full
sample. These calibration techniques follow the Merton-KMV approach which is an
established structural credit risk model used to test the effect of market-based information on
corporate default (Crosbie and Bon, 2003; Chen et al., 2010). This approach is a modified
version of the Merton (1974) framework and attempts to predict firms’ default based on their
underlying debt structure.
Based on the original Merton DD model, all payoffs to the shareholders of the firm are
similar to the payoffs from the call option on the firm’s assets with debt outstanding being the
exercise price. Hence, the model assumes that firms should have a single issue of zero-
coupon debt outstanding (D) which means that at a specified maturity date ( ) an amount of
D is due. As a rule of thumb, at maturity date ( ), the face value of debt (D) would be
received by debt holders if there is enough asset value (V) to meet this payment. Hence, at
maturity date if V>D, debt holders would receive D and equity holders will get the rest (V-
D). However, if the value of the firm’s assets is not sufficient to satisfy the debt holders
claims (V<D), debt holders will receive the total value of the firm’s asset and equity holders
15 Although our methodological approach does not control for size, as it is based on aggregate sector-level data,
we do believe that future improvements in the approach can be easily made by utilising a multi-attribute
matching procedure.
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will receive nothing. Our estimation procedure starts by considering the equity value as an
option on the value of the firm. It is noteworthy that in this case, on date  , equity holders
receive any amount remaining after the debt holders are paid off mathematically notated as


 
otherwise
DVifDV
,0
,
(1)
The payoff to equity holders expressed above is replicating the payoffs of a long call option
on the firm’s value with maturity  and strike price D. Hence the call value is equal to the
value of equity.
The main problem in implementing the Merton DD model is that the firm’s asset value
  and its volatility ( V ), two essential elements for estimating the distance to default (DD),
are both unobservable.16 Unlike the value of equity (E) and equity volatility ( E ), both of
which can be easily proxied by the use of market capitalisation (Das and Sundaram, 2004), V
and V have to be inferred. Crosbie and Bohn (2003) mention that the relationship between
equity volatility ( E ) and a firm’s asset volatility ( V ) indicated in the Merton DD model
might not lead to reasonable results as market leverage varies considerably in practice leading
to a biased estimation of the probability of default.17 To overcome this problem, we adopt the
Merton-KMV approach and use the Newton-iterative procedure to calculate   and V as our
unknown parameters.18 The average number of iterations needed for each L-SME in our
sample to reach convergence is 3, while all cases where a convergence criterion is not
16 If the firm’s asset value and its volatility are available, the firm’s probability of default could be estimated
easily. For example, other relevant studies such as that of Bharath and Shumway (2008) and Charitou et al.
(2013) estimate the firm’s value as the sum of the firm’s equity value and debt value.
17 For instance, when a firm’s credit risk is improving, the model might overstate the probability of a firm’s
default because the asset volatility will be overestimated if the market leverage goes down quickly. On the other
hand, at a time of rapid increase in market leverage, the firm’s asset volatility will be underestimated. In this
situation, in spite of the deterioration in the firm’s credit risk, the model understates the probability of the firm’s
default.
18 Convergence typically exists when the difference between the newly estimated asset value volatility ( V  ) and
the true asset value volatility ( V ) is less than
510 . A detailed explanation of the mathematical process for the
Merton DD model is provided in Bharath and Shumway (2008) and for the Newton-iterative method of the
Merton-KMV approach in Chen et al. (2010).
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reached are eliminated from our estimation sample (n =24). All L-SMEs’ equity values (E)
are extracted from Datastream for each calendar year-end. Likewise, equity value volatility(     ) is proxied using the standard deviation of the sample firms’ daily equity value (E) for
each year during the 2004-2012 sample period.19
A crucial parameter in the Merton-KMV model is the default point ( DPT ).
According to Crosbie and Bohn (2003), firms generally remain solvent when their asset value
is up to the book value of their total liabilities. However, at the time of default, the value of
the firm’s assets is commonly between the value of current liabilities and that of the total
liabilities. This is algebraically formulated as:
,01,  kLLkCLDPT (2)
where, DPT denotes the default point, CL stands for current liabilities and LL denotes the
long-term liabilities of the firm. Prior literature suggests that the predictive accuracy of the
model is sensitive to the default point changes (Huang and He, 2010; Lee, 2011). To ensure
comparability with prior studies we estimate the default point in our model using k = 0.5. The
last two integral parameters for building up the Merton-KMV credit default model are those
of liability maturity ( ) and the risk free rate ( r ). This study uses the one-year liability
maturity for  , and the Bank of England one-year base rate for r .
Having obtained V and V , we can then calculate the distance to default (DD) for the
remaining 174 L-SMEs from our initial sample (87.8%) defined as:
(3)
where V is the firm’s asset value, D are the debts in default points, and is the asset value
volatility. Moreover, the corresponding implied probability to default for each of the L-
19 Daily equity values are estimated using daily closing stock prices × number of outstanding shares over 252
trading days. Equity volatility is also estimated annually. This method is in line with prior studies in the field
(Hull et al., 2004).
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SMEs, often reported as expected default frequency ( EDF ) in the literature, is calculated as
 DDNEDF  (4)
where N is the cumulative standard normal distribution and DD is the distance to default.
3.3. Estimating hybrid indicators of default for the U-SMEs’ sample
To address the problem of estimating default risk for SMEs that are not publicly
listed, we introduce an innovative approach that allows us to capture the effect of both
accounting and market information by combining the Merton-KMV process with the
traditional use of a logistic regression model. The process is implemented in four steps which
are presented in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
In detail, we initially estimate the Merton-KMV probability of default (EDF) for the
174 L-SMEs and for each year during our sample period 2004 to 2012 using the process
described in section 3.2. The next step is to estimate individual L-SMEs’ default scores (
LSME
tX ). This is accomplished by using the inverse of the logistic function, defined as
)1(
ln LSME
it
LSME
itLSME
it KPG
KPGX

 (5)
where, LSMEitX represents individual L-SMEs’ logistic scores at time t, and
LSME
itKPG is the
individual probabilities of an L-SME not defaulting at time t, estimated as )1( LSMEitEDF .
20
Once all individual default scores ( LSMEitX ) are calculated, we are then using them as
dependent variables in a linear regression model with L-SMEs’ accounting indicators being
the explanatory variables using a forward stepwise selection procedure in line with Altman
and Sabato (2007). Our aim at this stage is to generate the relevant market-based coefficients
20As Altman and Sabato (2007) argue, the use of the Known Probability of Being Good (KPG) is superior as it
allows us to have positive slopes and positive intercepts given that higher logit scores indicate a lower
probability that a firm will default.
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that will be used to estimate the default probabilities for the U-SMEs sample. Hence, our
linear regression model is formulated as follows:
t
LSME
it
LSME
it
LSME
it
LSME
it
LSME
it
LSME
it
LSME
it
LSME
it
LSME
it
LSME
it
LSME
it
LSME
it
LSME
it
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it
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it
LSME
it
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CNSCACLTLTANISEBITTA
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
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
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1514131211
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(6)
where, LSMEitX is the individual logistic scores for the L-SMEs at time t described in Eq.(5),
RETA is the ratio of retained earnings to total assets used as a proxy for profitability; STA is
the ratio of sales to total assets (activity); COV is the ratio of EBITDA to interest expenses
(debt coverage); LEV is the ratio of short-term debt to equity book value (leverage); LIQ is
the ratio of cash to total assets (liquidity); EBITTA is the ratio of earnings before interest and
tax to total assets (profitability); NIS is the ratio of net income to net sales (profitability);
TLTA is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (leverage); CACL is the ratio of current
assets to current liabilities (liquidity); CNS is the ratio of cash to net sales (efficiency); CETL
is the ratio of total capital employed to the total liabilities (leverage); NCNW is the ratio of
net cash to net worth (liquidity); STDNW is the ratio of short-term debt to net worth (financial
distress); CLNCL is the ratio of current liabilities to the non-current liabilities (debt
structure); WCTA is the ratio of working capital to total assets (liquidity) and, t is the error
term.
The last stage of our calibration method involves the estimation of our
‘hybrid’/marker-based default score ( USMEmbitKPG
, ) for all U-SMEs. This is done by
employing a formula that combines the market-based coefficients from Eq. (6) alongside the
accounting indicators for each individual unlisted firm in our 2004-2012 sample
mathematically defined as
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(7)
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where, mb stands for market-based, and all other variables are described above.
3.4. Estimation of accounting-based indicators of default for U-SMEs’ sample
To evaluate the performance of our model, we compare its accuracy with that of an
existing accounting-based one. Prior literature suggests that the use of accounting-based
models can be appropriate in predicting SMEs’ default (Altman and Sabato, 2007; Altman et
al., 2010). Comparing the performance of our hybrid market-based model to the plain
accounting-based model allows us to assess the suitability and potentially superior efficiency
of our modelling approach. The plain accounting-based model is a standard logistic
regression that uses the same accounting ratios as above. Our accounting-based model is
defined as:



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WCTACLNCLSTDNWNCNWCETL
CNSCACLTLTANISEBITTA
LIQLEVCOVSTARETAKPG
1514131211
109876
543210
,
(8)
where, USMEabitKPG
, stands for Known Probability of Being Good for each U-SME at time t,
and ab stands for accounting-based. In line with Altman and Sabato (2007), this is a binary
variable with all U-SMEs that report their status as “active” being assigned the score 1, while
firms with company status “in liquidation”, “in administration” and “in receivership” are
given the value of 0. Finally, to account for the possible timing effects of default prediction
accuracy and reliability all empirical models described above include relevant time controls.21
4. Results
4.1. Default prediction for the L-SMEs sample using the Merton-KMV model.
As it is assumed in Merton-KMV model, the asset value is subject to normal distribution
and the default distance reflects the standard deviation from the company’s default. Thus,
21 One dummy from each set was dropped to avoid multicollinearity.
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firms’ expected default probability ( LSMEEDF ) can be calculated using the normality function
of distance to default (DD). According to Table 4, the average LSMEEDF value for the sample
is approximately 1.7 percent (1.695) while the minimum value is 0.000 and the maximum is
27.847 percent. By observing individual EDFs, we notice that a large number of default
probabilities within the sample (78%) range between 0.0 and 2.0 percent. However, there are
very few observations (outliers) for which the LSMEEDF score is substantially greater than
zero indicating that some L-SMEs have a high probability of default.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
In order to evaluate the performance of the market-based model we test its classification
accuracy by obtaining the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve for the L-SMEs
within our 2004-2012 sample period. According to Figure 2, the area under the ROC curve
(AUC) 22 is 0.8754 which indicates the performance of the Merton-KMV model in predicting
L-SMEs’ default events. This model is implemented as part of the calibration process to
derive the ‘hybrid’ coefficients that will subsequently be used in the estimation of default
scores for the entire U-SMEs sample. The accuracy of our model (AUC of 0.8754) appears to
be slightly better than that of a similar model used in the case of Chinese SMEs (AUC of
0.85) and the same k=0.5 default point (Chen et al., 2010).
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
4.2. Market-based (hybrid) and accounting-based model results for the L-SMEs sample
To avoid possible bias into our statistical estimates that might be introduced by outliers
in our data, all variables are winsorized 5% in each tail for both cases, i.e. the ‘hybrid’ and
the accounting-based regression models. Results on the use of the ‘hybrid’ logistic scores for
22 The area under the ROC curve and the equivalent index, the Gini Coefficient, are widely used to measure the
performance of classification models. The AUC is a measure of the difference between the score distributions of
failed and non-failed companies and the Gini coefficient is an index which can be calculated as .  12  AUC
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L-SMEs ( LSMEitX ) is presented in Table 5. According to our findings, the only insignificant
variable in the model is the ratio between current and non-current liabilities (CLNCL) for
which the coefficient is approximately zero. All other explanatory variables in this model are
mostly highly significant predictors in statistical terms of the ‘hybrid’ X-score for our L-
SMEs sample. For example, all profitability indicators, RETA, EBITTA and NIS show a
statistically significant positive relationship with their LSMEitX logistic scores which is in line
with standard finance theory, i.e. an increase in firms’ profitability leads to an increase in the
probability of not defaulting. The results on the leverage and liquidity indicators appear to be
similar, also showing a positive relationship which is significant at the 1% level. Rather
surprising, in terms of short-term liquidity, L-SMEs appear to be marginally influenced by an
increase in short-term debt. For example, as the LEV variable show, although an increase in
short-term liabilities has a negative impact on the probability of survival, the relevant
coefficient is significant only at the 10% level. The overall picture emerging is that the L-
SMEs, on average, tend to avoid large levels of debt in their capital structure, especially non-
current ones, for which the payback and interest extends far into the future. Finally, the
adjusted R-square of the linear regression is 85.45 percent and the F-test is also highly
significant at the 1% level, showing that our model is well fitted.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
We are now comparing the performance of our hybrid model with the standard logistic
accounting-based model. The results of this model regression are presented in Table 6.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
According to these results, all coefficient signs and significance levels are consistent to
prior literature (Altman et. al, 2010). The only statistically insignificant variable in the model
is LEV (coefficient of -0.0025) indicating no relationship between short-term debt increase
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and probability of survival for the case of the U-SMEs.23
4.3. Performance test of the models on the U-SME sample
The performance of the model with market indicators is tested by comparing its ROC
(AUC) with that of the standard accounting-based model in the 2013 hold-out sample and
also within the entire sample period 2004 to 2012.24 In order to create the hold-out sample,
166 defaulted firms were collected from the year 2013, while 2,265 active firms are also
randomly selected to keep the default rate of the sample for UK U-SMEs equal to the default
rate of the entire U-SMEs’ sample for 2004-2012 (6.72%). We retained data from 2013 in
order to undertake hold-out tests for model performance. The test is implemented by
predicting the defaulted firms in the 2013 hold-out sample using the hybrid USMEmbitKPG
, and
the accounting-based USMEabitKPG
, logistic scores for each firm in the sample. The descriptive
statistics of both default scores in the 2013 hold-out sample are reported in Table 7. The
results indicate higher mean values, on average, for the former model compared to the latter.
The mean value of the USMEmbitKPG
, model score is 4.521, while for the USMEabitKPG
, model is
only 2.574. Moreover, the standard deviation for the former model is higher, 1.172 and 0.732
respectively.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
These logistic scores are then used to estimate the probabilities-to-default (PDs) for both
models in the 2013 hold-out sample and the full 2004-12 periods, while the predictive ability
of both models is tested using the ROC reports. The results of ROC (AUC) indicate that the
23A careful examination of the test statistics for the accounting model in Table 6 reveals minor specification
issues, i.e. log-likelihood of -45720 and Wald Chi-square 3783 significant at the 1% level. As this logistic
regression replicates models used previously in the literature (Altman and Sabato, 2007; Altman et al., 2010) we
still report the results only for comparability purposes. We leave further improvements on this modelling
approach for future research.
24This method has been used as a validation technique by many relevant studies such as Altman et al. (2010) and
Chen et al. (2010) to test the accuracy of their models.
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model with the market information incorporated on it performs better when compared to the
plain accounting-based one. According to Figure 3, the area under the ROC curve for the
hybrid model in the 2013 hold-out sample is 0.8387 which indicates a good level of
classification accuracy. This is evidently superior to the ROC (AUC 0.7901) for the model
based solemnly on accounting information. Similarly, we report the ROC tests for both
models within the entire 2004-2012 sample. The results from the within-sample test further
confirm the superiority of the hybrid model in demonstrating better performance over its pure
accounting-based counterpart (AUC-values of 0.8479 and 0.8114 respectively). These results
are also superior to the results of Altman et al. (2010) in which the UK SME model’s
accuracy for the hold-out sample is lower (AUC 0.76 and AUC 0.75) than that of our
modelling approach (AUC 0.8387). Moreover, our model’s overall accuracy (AUC 0.8479) is
also higher than that from Altman et al. (2010) who report AUC of 0.78 and 0.80 within the
entire sample. This clearly indicates the importance of using market-wide information in
predicting U-SMEs’ default events and the merits of our innovative modelling approach.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
One of the main issues with the use of accounting-based default prediction models discussed
in the literature is that they are not reliable during periods of financial crises. This issue can
be more problematic for the case of U-SMEs as accounting-based models and scorecards are
widely used by all credit providers for predicting SMEs’ default. On the one hand, as the
likelihood of SMEs’ financial failure during recessions is higher, it is essential for the banks
to be able to use the default prediction model with the highest predictive power to avoid
potential losses. On the other hand, the SMEs’ accounting-based default prediction models
are found not to be accurate when used for short sample periods. This problem becomes
more severe during periods of financial turmoil when it is essential for all credit providers to
predict the firm’s default within short-term time frames, given that financially weak firms
23
might not manage to survive such troublesome periods.
We implement a test to investigate the predictive performance of our hybrid model
against the accounting-based one during the financial crises and also for short-term periods.
To do so, a hold-out sample is created in the end of the financial year 2008 with 150
defaulted firms and 2,056 active firms from our sample. 25 Using the hybrid and the
accounting-based models, we estimate the relevant KPGs with the aim to predict the SMEs’
default events in the 2008 hold-out sample. This allows us to test the accuracy of the two
models by observing the company status at the end of 2009 and comparing that to the
relevant predicted defaults. The results of the accuracy tests using the ROC curve are
illustrated in Figure 4.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
As we can see from Figure 4, the accuracy of the hybrid model ( USMEmbitKPG
, ) in
predicting U-SMEs default during the financial crisis is far superior with an AUC-value of
0.8362 compared to the AUC-value of 0.7781 for the accounting-based model ( USMEabitKPG
, ).
Further tests on the predictive accuracy of our model for U-SMEs’ default within short-time
periods produce a similar picture. By comparing the estimated KPGs from the financial years
2004-2012, we observe again that the accuracy of the hybrid model within annual intervals is
superior to that of the standard accounting-based model for 8 out of the 9 years in our sample.
According to Table 8, it is only for 2011 where the prediction accuracy of the hybrid model
(79.81%) is marginally lower than the one of the accounting-based model (80.31%).
[Insert Table 8 about here]
The accuracy rate of the hybrid model for the rest of our sample period appears to be
considerably better. Hence, based on these results we can conclude with confidence that our
proposed market-based model performs better in short-time periods which is very critical for
25 The default rate of the 2008 hold-out sample is also equal to the default rate of the entire SME sample
(6.72%).
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all SMEs and especially for the case of unlisted ones where their financial performance is less
monitored by relevant market forces and creditors alike.
5. Conclusion
An accurate U-SMEs’ default prediction model is crucial for all relevant stakeholders,
including banks and other credit providers, the companies’ owners, government agencies,
accounting professionals, etc. It primarily helps banks to assess U-SMEs’ financial prospects
with a higher level of accuracy, reducing the lenders’ potential losses due to credit
misallocation. It also enables banks to estimate the capital requirement for their U-SMEs’
lending portfolio more accurately by truly reflecting the riskiness of such firms. As a more
accurate prediction model reduces the chance of credit misallocation, the funds will be
distributed fairly among the entire SMEs’ lending portfolio which can lead to corporate
growth and to minimisation of lost income from the banks’ perspective.
The comparative results of our study indicate that the hybrid U-SMEs’ default
prediction model which employs market-based information along with the accounting-based
information performs considerably better when compared to its accounting-based counterpart
for (i) the entire period under investigation, (ii) during and after the period of the financial
crisis; as well as (iii) during short-term default prediction time frames. These results make
our modelling approach an elaborate default prediction tool for such types of firms, where
any monitoring mechanisms such as those typically imposed by market forces in the case of
publicly-listed firms is intrinsically absent. This is because both accounting and market
information appear to be incrementally informative to each other when assessing the credit
quality of a firm. We argue that the methodological approach of including market information
of listed-SMEs along with accounting information of U-SMEs is therefore not only crucial
but also a very reliable mechanism in predicting default for such firms and should be used
25
confidently by all finance providers.
In this respect, we believe that the proposed modelling approach is not only beneficial
to those banks advocating transactional lending technologies but also those that employ
relationship-based ones. More recent literature shows that during financial crises relationship
banking ensures better continuation of credit facilities mostly to profitable firms, especially in
the case of U-SMEs (D’Aurizio et al., 2015; Bolton et al., 2016). As the method proposed in
this paper increases the accuracy of prediction during financial crises for U-SMEs, it can
provide banks advocating hard-information technologies with a useful tool to safeguard their
assets during aggregate credit contractions without having to restrict lending across their
entire U-SMEs’ portfolio.
Furthermore, its ability to create a basis for lenders to compare between listed- and
unlisted-SMEs makes it a suitable and easy-to-use initial screening tool alongside typical
credit scoring techniques before the gathering of soft information with the use of loan officers
takes place. This may have important implications for both the cost of the lending service to
smaller credit providers but also to the larger banks that are predominately engaged in hard
information lending.
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Table 1
Annual sample default rate for unlisted and listed SMEs (2004 to 2013)
Years
U-SMEs L-SMEs
Active % Defaulted % Active % Defaulted %
2004 20,694 94.24 1,265 5.76 188 94.95 10 5.05
2005 20,313 94.35 1,216 5.65 183 95.31 9 4.69
2006 19,671 93.66 1,331 6.34 180 94.74 10 5.26
2007 19,602 92.79 1,524 7.21 179 94.21 11 5.79
2008 18,486 91.44 1,731 8.56 175 93.58 12 6.42
2009 17,740 90.56 1,850 9.44 173 93.51 12 6.49
2010 19,001 93.82 1,251 6.18 182 93.81 12 6.19
2011 20,024 94.24 1,224 5.76 180 94.74 10 5.26
2012 20,425 93.48 1,424 6.52 183 94.82 10 5.18
2013 20,851 93.90 1,354 6.10 184 94.85 10 5.15
Total 196,807 93.28 14,170 6.72 1,807 94.46 106 5.54
Notes
This table reports the number of listed and unlisted SMEs and the frequency of default events for each calendar year and for each group. L-SMEs stands for
listed SMEs; U-SMEs stands for unlisted SMEs.
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Table 2
Descriptive analysis of accounting indicators for unlisted and listed SMEs (2004-2013)
U-SMEs L-SMEs
Variable Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max
RETA -0.2534 0.0129 -0.6693 0.3217 -0.0103 0.0097 -0.2726 0.1164
STA 0.0090 0.0185 -0.5174 0.3818 0.0188 0.0175 -0.2425 0.2511
COV 84.5813 25.7211 0.0000 586.0000 99.5216 14.3114 0.0000 955.5000
LEV 1.5666 0.7111 -6.5701 15.0490 1.5072 0.6796 -2.9865 10.8652
LIQ 0.1469 0.0523 0.0000 0.6925 0.0639 0.0244 0.0000 0.3277
EBITTA 0.6155 0.4436 0.0000 2.2777 0.2479 0.2240 0.0000 0.7337
NIS 0.3245 0.3026 0.0000 0.8260 0.2277 0.2117 0.0000 0.6383
TLTA 1.9081 1.4201 0.3720 6.1781 2.5555 1.8502 0.9403 7.7632
CACL 1.6891 1.2481 0.2368 5.7092 2.0423 1.4876 2.0423 6.5727
CNS 0.1058 0.0315 0.0000 0.6509 0.0722 0.0242 0.0000 0.4184
CETL 1.5646 0.8511 -0.5000 7.6363 1.8128 1.2250 0.0757 6.9250
NCNW 0.3229 0.0728 -0.2500 2.0000 0.1351 0.0488 0.0000 0.6702
STDNW 1.6844 0.7783 -4.9795 13.7881 1.2710 0.6179 -1.3703 8.2434
CLNCL 19.0348 4.2694 0.2149 136.0000 14.6209 4.0173 0.3111 110.7822
WCTA 0.0929 0.1389 -1.0833 0.7641 0.1350 0.1418 0.0000 0.2696
Notes
This table reports the mean and median values of the accounting ratios for the listed and unlisted SME samples. All variables are winsorised 5% in each tail
to eliminate the presence of outliers. RETA is the ratio of retained earnings to total assets; STA is the ratio of sales to total assets, COV is the ratio of EBITDA
to interest expenses; LEV is the ratio of short-term debt to equity book value; LIQ is the ratio of cash to total assets; EBITTA is the ratio of earnings before
interest and tax to total assets; NIS is the ratio of net income to sales; TLTA is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; CACL is the ratio of current assets to
current liabilities; CNS is the ratio of cash to net sales; CETL is the ratio of total capital employed to the total liabilities; NCNW is the ratio of net cash to net
worth; STDNW is the ratio of short-term debt to net worth; CLNCL is the ratio of current liabilities to the non-current liabilities; and finally, WCTA is the
ratio of working capital to total assets. L-SMEs stands for listed SMEs; U-SMEs stands for unlisted SMEs.
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Table 3
Financial position of sample companies in absolute terms from 2004 to 2013 (£000s)
U-SMEs L-SMEs
Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max
Total Liabilities 4,733.8 2,876.5 0.0 15,000.0 5,437.0 3,014.8 0.0 28,400.0
Retained Earnings 1,963.8 1,567.9 -2,470.0 9,600.0 7,696.0 8,452.7 -7,100.0 13,041.2
Sales 15,352.5 11,815.8 0.0 41,000.0 35,769.1 22,815.3 1.0 41,934.6
Total Assets 5,480.4 2,956.2 0.0 17,200.0 7,755.0 6,020.4 10.0 32,900.0
Book Value of Equity 2,256.4 990.3 -1,448.0 4,100.0 3,130.1 1,934.6 -681.5 5,393.0
Notes
This table reports average, median, minimum and maximum values for key financial items for our samples of unlisted (U-SMEs) and listed SMEs (L-SMEs).
All data are extracted from Thomson’s DataStream (L-SMEs) and Bureau Van Dijk’s FAME (U-SMEs) covering the period 2004 to 2013.
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Figure 1
‘Hybrid’/Market-based default score calibration for U-SMEs
Notes
This figure reports the process of deriving the default scores for the unlisted SMEs (U-SMEs) in our sample. L-SMEs stands for listed SMEs, EDF stands for Expected
Default Frequency, KPG stands for Known Probability of Being Good, mb stands for market-based.
Step 1
Use of Merton-KMV model
to estimate the probability of
default (EDF) for the L-
SMEs sample.
Step 2
Estimate L-SMEs market-
based logisitc scores from
Eq.(5).
Step 3
Estimate 'hybrid'/market-based
coefficients using a linear regression
model with individual L-SMEs' logistic
scores as dependent variables and L-
SMEs' acounting indicators as
independent variables.
Step 4
Use the market-based coefficients
from Step 3 in combination with the
accounting indicators of the U-SMEs
to predict the default probabilities of
the U-SMEs (KPGmb,USME ) .
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics of market-based EDFs (2004 to 2012)
n Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Err
LSMEEDF (%) 1420 0.000 27.847 1.695 4.313
Notes
This table shows the summary statistics for the Expected Default Frequency (EDF) results for our L-SMEs
sample for the period 2004 to 2012. L-SMEs stands for listed SMEs.
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Figure 2
ROC curve using the Merton-KMV model for the L-SMEs sample (2004 – 2012)
Notes
The area under the ROC curve (AUC) indicates the performance of the market-based Merton-
KMV model in predicting L-SMEs default. L-SMEs stands for listed SMEs.
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Table 5
Market-based (hybrid) linear regression results for the L-SMEs sample (2004-2012)
LSME
itX
(n=961)
Coefficient Robust std.err.
Constant 2.1035*** 0.01835
RETA 0.2387*** 0.07596
STA 0.4471*** 0.07540
COV 0.0006*** 0.00004
LEV -0.0024* 0.00138
LIQ 1.0852*** 0.16366
EBITTA 0.1344*** 0.03551
NIS 0.1494*** 0.04205
TLTA -0.1122*** 0.02061
CACL 0.0275*** 0.00464
CNS 0.5519*** 0.11912
CETL 0.2049*** 0.02220
NCNW 0.1243*** 0.04352
STDNW -0.0044*** 0.00220
CLNCL 0.0002 0.00021
WCTA 0.2127*** 0.07229
R-Squared 0.8568
Adj. R-Squared 0.8545
F-value (15, 945) 218.32***
Notes
This table shows the results of the linear regression of market-based logistic scores for the L-SMEs sample as a
dependent variable against accounting ratios as independent variables for 2004 to 2012 (Step 3 of Figure 1).
All variables are winsorised 5% in each tail to eliminate the presence of outliers. LSMEitX is the individual
logistic scores for the L-SMEs at time t; RETA is the ratio of retained earnings to total assets; STA is the ratio
of sales to total assets; COV is the ratio of EBITDA to interest expenses; LEV is the ratio of short-term debt to
equity book value; LIQ is the ratio of cash to total assets; EBITTA is the ratio of earnings before interest and
tax to total assets; NIS is the ratio of net income to net sales; TLTA is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets;
CACL is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities; CNS is the ratio of cash to net sales; CETL is the ratio
of total capital employed to the total liabilities; NCNW is the ratio of net cash to net worth; STDNW is the ratio
of short-term debt to net worth; CLNCL is the ratio of current liabilities to the non-current liabilities; WCTA is
the ratio of working capital to total assets. L-SMEs stands for listed SMEs. Time, industry and ownership
dummies are included but not displayed. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 6
Accounting-based logistic regression results for the U-SMEs sample (2004-2012)
USMEab
itKPG
,
(n=107,061)
Coefficient Robust std.err.
Constant 1.5529*** 0.03335
RETA 0.6502*** 0.07466
STA 1.1106*** 0.09720
COV 0.0013*** 0.00009
LEV -0.0025 0.00226
LIQ 0.8628*** 0.16708
EBITTA 0.4948*** 0.02936
NIS 0.2922*** 0.06621
TLTA -0.0918*** 0.01653
CACL 0.1055*** 0.02175
CNS 1.0165*** 0.16759
CETL 0.1261*** 0.01071
NCNW 0.2130*** 0.02907
STDNW -0.0271*** 0.00305
CLNCL 0.0011*** 0.00028
WCTA 0.3627*** 0.04301
AIC 91472.13
Log-likelihood -45720.07
Pseudo R-squared 0.0458
Wald Chi-square 3783.45***
Notes
This table reports the results of the logistic regression that uses accounting-based variables for our sample of
U-SMEs during the period 2004 to 2012. All variables are winsorised 5% in each tail to eliminate the impact of
outliers. The dependent variable, USMEabitKPG
, , stands for Known Probability of being Good in line with Altman
and Sabato (2007). RETA is the ratio of retained earnings to total assets; STA is the ratio of sales to total assets;
COV is the ratio of EBITDA to interest expenses; LEV is the ratio of short-term debt to equity book value; LIQ
is the ratio of cash to total assets; EBITTA is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; NIS is
the ratio of net income to net sales; TLTA is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; CACL is the ratio of
current assets to current liabilities; CNS is the ratio of cash to net sales; CETL is the ratio of total capital
employed to the total liabilities; NCNW is the ratio of net cash to net worth; STDNW is the ratio of short-term
debt to net worth; CLNCL is the ratio of current liabilities to the non-current liabilities; WCTA is the ratio of
working capital to total assets. U-SMEs stands for unlisted SMEs; ab stands for accounting-based. Time,
industry and ownership dummies are included but not displayed; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%.
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Table 7
Descriptive statistics of default scores for U-SMEs for the 2013 hold-out sample
Variable n Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Accounting-based default scores ( USMEabitKPG
, ) 2,431 2.5742 0.7323 -1.3214 29.3544
‘Hybrid’/Market-based default scores ( USMEmbitKPG
, ) 2,431 4.5213 1.1718 0.8765 36.6541
Notes
The table shows the aggregate difference between accounting-based and the market-based default scores. These logistic scores are used to estimate the
PDs for the 2013 hold-out sample using both models and the accuracy rates are estimated subsequently. U-SMEs stands for unlisted SMEs.
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Figure 3
ROC curves for U-SMEs’ hybrid- and accounting-based models using the 2013 hold-out sample and the full 2004-2012 sample period
Hybrid model (2013 hold-out sample) Accounting-based model (2013 hold-out sample)
Hybrid model (Full-sample period: 2004-2012) Accounting-based model (Full-sample period: 2004-2012)
Notes
The area under the ROC curve (AUC) indicates the performance of the model in predicting U-SMEs’ default. U-SMEs stands for unlisted SMEs.
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Figure 4
ROC curves for U-SMEs’ hybrid- and accounting-based models using the 2008 hold-out sample (Financial Crisis Period)
Hybrid model (2008 hold-out sample) Accounting-based model (2008 hold-out sample)
Notes
The area under the ROC curve (AUC) indicates the performance of the model in predicting U-SMEs’ default. U-SMEs stands for unlisted SMEs.
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Table 8
Accuracy tests of the U-SMEs’ hybrid and accounting-based models (2004-2012)
Year Hybrid model Accounting-based model
2004 85.88% 82.12%
2005 85.24% 84.21%
2006 85.35% 83.34%
2007 83.11% 80.52%
2008 82.73% 77.16%
2009 82.92% 79.33%
2010 80.09% 77.79%
2011 79.81% 80.31%
2012 84.23% 80.64%
Notes
The table shows the difference between the accuracy rates of the ‘hybrid’/market-based and the
accounting-based models for each calendar year in our U-SMEs’ sample. Accuracy is estimated by
comparing the predicted U-SMEs’ defaults to the actual status of each firm in the end of each calendar
year. U-SMEs stands for unlisted SMEs.
